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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY, 
OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs . 
REBECCA LARSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD HORTON, 
Applicant for Intervention 
and Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 20833 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal presents one simple issue. That is, 
whether a tort claimant is entitled to intervene as a matter 
of right as a party defendant, in a declaratory action 
initiated by an insurer against its putative insured, 
wherein the insurer seeks a determination that it owes no 
obligation of defense or payment to or on behalf of such 
insured. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a declaratory action arising from a motorcycle 
automobile accident which occurred in July, 19 84, between 
Defendant and Intervenor. This appeal concerns the right of 
Intervenor to intervene as a party defendant in the 
proceeding where Plaintiff insurer seeks a determination 
that it owes no obligation of defense or payment to or on 
behalf of Defendant arising from such accident. 
This action was initiated in April, 1985. Defendant 
appeared pro se and Intervenor filed a Motion to Intervene 
as a Defendant, which Motion was denied by Order of the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. Intervenor's Notice of Appeal 
was filed herein on August 1, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is little dispute concerning the facts in this 
proceeding. On or about July 11, 19 84, Intervenor was 
injured in a collision in Salt Lake City, Utah between his 
motorcycle and an automobile driven by Defendant. (R.3, 15, 
16, 24). At that time, Defendant was residing with her 
father, Melvin S. Larsen, with whom Plaintiff was an insurer 
pursuant to an insurance policy. (R.3). The vehicle driven 
by Defendant was owned by one Paul Lawrence, who maintained 
a policy of insurance with Prudential Insurance Company with 
policy limits of $50,000.00. (R.3, 36, 42). In connection 
with the collision, Defendant was cited for improper 
lookout. Intervenor received no citation. (R.16). 
As a result of the collision, Intervenor was 
hospitalized for approximately seven weeJcs and underwent 
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seven operations culminating in the amputation of his right 
leg approximately five inches below the knee. (R.16). 
Intervenor has incurred medical expenses of $60,000.00, been 
disabled since the collision and has incurred substantial 
general damages. (R.16). 
On April 25, 1985, Plaintiff filed its complaint 
seeking a determination that it owed no obligation of 
defense or payment to or on behalf of Defendant in 
connection with the accident. (R.2). On May 28, 1985, 
Defendant filed a pro se Answer wherein she admitted that 
Plaintiff did not owe any obligation of defense or payment 
and that she expected no coverage from the subject insurance 
policy. (R.24, 25). 
On May 28, 1985, Intervenor filed his Motion to 
Intervene as a Defendant and a proposed Answer pursuant to 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds 
that the representation of Intervener's interests by 
Defendant was inadequate and that Intervenor would be bound 
by a judgment therein. (R.22). The proposed Answer 
asserted, inter alia, that the subject policy of insurance 
provided coverage for the collision between Defendant and 
Intervenor on the basis that Defendant's vehicle was a 
non-owned vehicle driven by the named insured's relative, 
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Melvin S. Larsen, and that Plaintiff had in bad faith 
initiated the proceeding. (R.6, 16, 17, 18, 30, 31). 
Intervener's Motion was denied by Order dated July 2, 
1985. (R.53, 54). This Appeal was then filed on August 1, 
1985. (R.55) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
establishes four requirements which must be met to allow a 
non-party to intervene in a proceeding as a matter of right. 
These requirements are: 
1. A timely application to intervene, 
2. An interest in the subject matter of the dispute, 
3. Inadequate representation or possible inadequate 
representation of its interests, and 
4. A judgment in the action will or may bind the 
appli cant. 
Intervenor herein satisfies these requirements as 
discussed in depth by the Court in Lima v. Chambers, 65 7 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1982) and the denial of his Motion to 
Intervene as a party defendant herein was erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, A TORT CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO INTERVENTION OF 
RIGHT AS A PARTY DEFENDANT IN A DECLARATORY ACTION INITIATED 
BY AN INSURER AGAINST ITS INSURED. 
Intervention of right is governed by Rule 24(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule reads as follows: 
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Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an 
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
representation of the applicant's interest by existing 
parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or 
may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when 
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely 
affected by a distribution or other disposition of 
property which is in the custody or subject to the 
control or disposition of the court or an officer 
thereof. 
Intervention as a party defendant herein is sought 
pursuant to paragraph (2) of Rule 24(a). By the terms of 
that rule, four requirements must be met to establish 
intervention of right: 
1. A timely application to intervene, 
2. An interest in the subject matter of the dispute, 
3. Inadequate representation or possible inadequate 
representation of its interests, and 
4. A judgment in the action will or may bind the 
applicant. 
These requirements were recently discussed in depth by 
this Court in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P2d 279 (19 82), That 
case involved a motion to intervene by the automobile 
liability insurance carrier in the tort action between its 
insured and an uninsured motorist tortfeasor. 
It has not been disputed that the first requirement, 
timeliness, was met by Intervenor. The Motion to Intervene, 
supported by a proposed Answer, was filed on May 28, 1985, 
the same day that Defendant filed her pro se Answer and 
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twenty days after the service of the Summons and Complaint 
upon her. Thus, Intervenor sought to become a party to the 
litigation at its earliest stage and in a timely manner.• 
The second requirement is that the Intervenor has an 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute. In Lima, 
this Court interpreted this requirement to mean that the 
Intervenor must stand to either gain or lose by the 
operation of the judgment to be rendered. 
It is clear that Intervenor stands to lose by the 
operation of a judgment which establishes that Insurer has 
no obligation of payment on behalf of Defendant for injuries 
caused to Intervenor by her negligence. Due to the fact 
that a judgment herein in favor of the Insurer will leave 
Defendant with insurance coverage through another carrier 
with policy limits of only $50,000.00, Intervenor will be 
deprived of the opportunity to recover the full amount of 
his damages arising from Defendant's negligence, which 
damages consist of the loss of his leg, in excess of 
$60,000.00 in medical expenses, disability since July 11, 
1984 and his substantial general damages. This deprivation 
establishes that Intervenor stands to lose by the operation 
of a judgment therein and has a sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the action to meet the second requirement. 
The third requirement is that the Intervener's interest 
will or may be inadequately represented by the existing 
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defendant. In Limaf this Court discussed this requirement 
as consisting of two components. First, whether there is an 
identity or a divergence of interest between the Intervenor 
and the original party and second, whether that interest is 
diligently represented. 
In the instant proceeding, as in Lima, Intervener's 
interest is different from that of Defendant and as a 
result, not represented. This divergence is represented by 
Defendant's Answer which admits that Insurer owes no 
obligation of defense or payment. Defendant's interest 
appears to be in minimizing her costs in defending this 
proceeding rather than in a determination of whether Insurer 
owes an obligation to Defendant pursuant to the terms of the 
policy. 
Furthermore, Defendant is not represented by counsel, 
which fact this Court indicated in Lima created a strong 
presumption against adequate representation. Defendant's 
pro se Answer contains admissions, which may not have any 
legal or factual basis, upon which Insurer would obtain a 
judgment in its favor. Thus, Intervenor satisfies the third 
requirement. 
The final requirement is that the Intervenor is or may 
be bound by a judgment in the action. In Lima, this Court 
discussed the conflict of authority which exists concerning 
the meaning of the word "bound." In so doing, this Court 
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rejected the strict interpretation of those authorities 
which requires a showing that the judgment would be res 
judicata to the Intervenor and instead adopted the majority 
rule of a more liberal construction requiring only a showing 
that the Intervenor would be bound in a practical sense in 
that his interest is impaired in some way by the judgment. 
As a practical matter, Intervenor would be "bound" by a 
judgment in favor of Insurer establishing that no coverage 
exists pursuant to its policy and his interest would be 
impaired in that he would be left without an avenue to 
obtain a full recovery for his injuries incurred in the 
underlying automobile accident. Accordingly, the fourth 
requirement for intervention is met. 
It is admitted that the factual background of Lima is 
substantially different from that of this proceeding. While 
Linia involved intervention by the contractual insurer in 
tne tort action between its insured and an uninsured 
motorist tortfeasor, the instant action involves 
intervention by the tort claimant in the contractual action 
between the insurer and its insured tortfeasor. It is not 
logical, however, to allow intervention in the former 
situation, but not in the latter. 
No authority is found in this jurisdiction either 
allowing or denying intervention to a tort claimant in the 
contractual action between the insurer and its insured. In 
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fact, there is a scarcity of cases from other jurisdictions 
on this issue. Authority for the allowance of such 
intervention does, however, exist. See Miller v. Market 
Men's Mutual Insurance Company, 115 N.W. 2d 266 (Minn. 
1962). In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed 
the tort claimant to intervene in the third-party action 
between the tortfeasor and its insurer for declaratory 
relief to determine the coverage afforded by the insurance 
policy, stating: 
It is our opinion that where the issue of contract 
liability between an insurer and an insured in an 
action of this kind is separated for trial from the 
main action, no prejudice can result to anyone if the 
injured party is permitted to intervene in that action. 
In denying intervention in this proceeding, the lower 
Court apparently relied on Utah Farm Bureau v. Chugg, 315 
P.2d 277 (Utah 1957). That reliance is misplaced as that 
case is clearly distinguishable from this proceeding. In 
Chugg, the tort claimant initiated an action for damages 
against the insured tortfeasor. The insurer then filed a 
declaratory action against its insured seeking to determine 
its rights under the insurance policy and joined the tort 
claimant as a party defendant. Thus, Chugg involved 
permissive joinder under Rule 20 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rather than Rule 24 intervention of right which 
is at issue herein. 
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In stating that the tort claimant's joinder could not 
be compelled under those circumstances, this Court expressed 
the concern that to allow otherwise would permit the insurer 
to delay the tort action for the purpose of determining in 
advance whether it should defend its insured in that action 
and would drag the tort claimant into an action in which he 
did not desire to be a party, stating: 
An injured party should have the right, if he desires, 
to have his action tried with dispatch and without 
regard to any dispute between the person who injured 
him and the latterfs insurer or insurers. 
The joinder involved in Chugg is clearly different 
than the intervention that is sought herein. Intervenor is 
not seeking to join his negligence claim against Defendant 
to Insurer's claim to construe the provisions of the 
insurance contract nor is he attempting to join Insurer as a 
party in the separate negligence action that he has 
commenced against Defendant. Intervenor is not seeking to 
interpose any issues which do not presently exist in this 
proceeding. He is merely attempting to intervene to see 
that his interests are adequately represented in the action 
declaring the terms of the insurance contract. This limited 
purpose is evidenced by the proposed Answer filed by 
Intervenor, which merely seeks to construe the terms of the 
insurance policy. 
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This Court further stated in Chugg at 406 as follows: 
Indeed, if such tort victim is a proper party to the 
present action,then it would appear that the insurance 
company, and other companies similarly situated, is a 
proper party to a tort action against the insured - a 
proposition which, it is safe to assume, such companies 
would not espouse. 
Since such a proposition has since been espoused 
insurance companies and has been endorsed by this Court in 
Lima, the time has come when intervention as a matter of 
right should be granted to a tort claimant in declaratory 
action between an insurer and its insured. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
clearly designed to allow a procedure by which a non-party 
having a substantial interest m the litigation and whose 
interest will not be adequately protected by the litigants 
to intervene. To allow intervention as a party defendant in 
this proceeding will insure that the Insurer's claim of 
non-coverage is fully and fairly litigated. 
Any adverse effect on the present parties resulting 
from intervention is outweighed by the substantial prejudice 
to Intervenor if his application to intervene is denied. 
Having met the four requirements for intervention of right 
Intervenor should be allowed to intervene as a party 
defendant in the action between the insurer and its putative 
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i n s u r e d . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e lower C o u r t ' s Order d e n y i n g t h e 
Motion t o I n t e r v e n e i s e r r o n e o u s and t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d be 
remanded w i t h t h e d i r e c t i o n t h a t I n t e r v e n o r be named a s a 
p a r t y d e f e n d a n t and be a l l o w e d t o f u l l y p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e 
l i t i g a t i o n . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ day of O c t o b e r , 1985 '^* ^ ° c t o b e r , 
DAVID R. BLAISDELL 
A t t o r n e y for A p p l i c a n t fo r 
I n t e r v e n t i o n and A p p e l l a n t 
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I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e / ^ day of O c t o b e r , 
1 9 8 5 , I m a i l e d if t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p ^ b f t h e f o r e g o i n g 
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F. Robert Bayle 
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